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The Interplay between Politics and Business in Papua New Guinea 
 
 
David Kavanamur* 
 
 
In the long term it is the people of Niugini who make one confident.  They 
possess a courtesy, imagination and pragmatic strength to provide their 
own solutions (Nelson 1974:230). 
 
 
1.  Overview 
 
There is no shortage of opinion (from experts or laymen) when it comes to 
politics, business and strategy in Papua New Guinea (PNG), Australia’s 
closest neighbour and leading partner in development.  Young and hard-
working Papua New Guineans as well as the grassroots people appreciate 
the sincerity of Australia’s desire to see PNG succeed and beat its 
‘backwater’ label. However, more often than not, recommended solutions 
get overtaken by the myriad problems threatening to overwhelm the 
country. 
 
In this paper, I focus on relations between business and politics, and 
concentrate on the crucial factor of the contemporary PNG cultures of politics 
and of business, and the relationship between these cultures.  I use a 
strategic management lens1 in suggesting strategies to influence aspects of 
the PNG national cultural mind-set that impact on politics and business.  I 
am aware, of course, of the utility of other historical and institutional lenses.  
If anything, these lenses complement each other and contribute towards a 
holistic framework for analysing PNG’s development problems. 
 
There is an intricate link between the governmental environment and 
business in PNG, which needs to be understood if strategies are to be 
designed for a prosperous future for the bulk of Papua New Guineans.  As 
pointed out by Standish (1999), cultural factors are at the centre of 
                                                          
* PhD candidate, School of Management & Marketing, University of Western Sydney, and Lecturer in Public Policy 
and Management, University of Papua New Guinea, (Kavanamur@hotmail.com). I am deeply indebted to Dr. Bill 
Standish, Australian National University, for insightful comments and editorial assistance. The paper was initially 
presented on 19 September 2001 at the Australian Parliamentary Library, as the views of a young Papua New 
Guinean on a desirable future for PNG, and on 21 September at a SSGM Project seminar at the Australian National 
University, highlighting the idiosyncrasies.  Comments during both seminars are greatly appreciated, and. David 
Hegarty also offered valuable comments. I am also grateful to Dr. Henry Okole for use of his tables on elections and 
party politics. 
1  Analysts and laypersons do not all perceive the same ‘reality’. Rather, different ‘conceptual lenses’ lead to 
different interpretations of the same situation (Allison 1971), as different parts of the same problem are emphasised 
and analysed according to one’s Weltanschauugen or world-view (Checkland 1999).  
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development and governance problems.  Larmour (2000) also explores the 
links between institutional failure in Melanesia and cultural values.  He 
suggests that institutional survival or muddling through is one thing, while 
performance is quite another 2 .  Ron May (2000) notes that PNG’s 
development problems derive not so much from institutions per se, but from 
lack of appropriate behaviour.  He further makes the point that “institutional 
capacity building and strengthening projects, mostly funded by international 
donors, may be helpful in supporting good governance, but are not a 
substitute for systematic policy commitment by government” (May 2000:9). 
 
Culture is usually analysed at two levels: national and organisational.  Whilst 
it is difficult to change deep-seated national/societal cultural mind-sets, the 
‘organisational cultures’ requisite for development could be harnessed by 
transformational political and business leaders. 
 
At the outset, I highlight several key problems. Although it is difficult to 
clearly define what constitutes the PNG national cultural mind-set, the 
following problems stem from certain cultural aspects of PNG: 
 
 political instability that gives rise to a volatile and unpredictable business 
environment 
 
 the abuse of political power in frequent hiring and firing of departmental 
secretaries and state enterprise executives 
 
 arising from an unstable business environment, an ‘uneasy nexus’ has 
been forged between government and business through kickbacks in 
multi-million Kina projects 
 
 decision-making at Cabinet, Parliament and bureaucratic levels lacks 
rational components because of the dominance of intuition, resulting in 
frequent policy reversals 
 
 public-policy is often based on improvisation and solely geared towards 
political survival 
 
Collusion between state officials and private companies is threatening to 
become the norm, as part of the national cultural mind-set.  This direct 
nexus between government and business is becoming unhealthy for a truly 
open market economy (Kavanamur 1998b).  Business leaders should not 
succumb to the prevailing culture of winning tendered projects by building 
                                                          
2   Other studies with implications for development include Lawrence (1964, 1967), Epstein (1968), Moulik (1972), 
Finney (1973), Wolfers (1982), Saffu (1982), Philip (1986), Fergie (1989), Monsell-Davis (1993), Dickson (1995), 
Scholl (1997), McGavin (1998), Imbun (1998), May (2001), and others summarised in Kavanamur (1994). 
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commissions or kickbacks, at the request of corrupt politicians and 
bureaucrats, or lobbying for Certificates of Inexpediency to avoid 
competitive bidding processes.  Millions of Kina have been lost through self-
designed contracts for the supply of goods and services (Nonggorr 
2001a,b,c,d). 
 
 
2.  Desirable future scenario – 2020 
 
Papua New Guinea has sufficient natural and energy resources to propel 
itself into a modest future, where the basic needs of its citizens are met 
internally.  The country is near markets in Northeast and Southeast Asia, 
Australia and New Zealand.  However, there are major leakages and 
wastage within the government-organisational structure through which 
capital is lost.  Plugging these gaping holes requires national leaders to 
realign organisational components of the political and bureaucratic 
machinery, particularly: 
 
 the application of technology, and 
 
 the practices of communication and continuous learning 
 
The ingredient that oils the wheels of management and therefore is bound to 
have a lasting positive effect is culture, both national and organisational.  
According to Hofstede (1997) culture is the ‘soft ware’ of the mind.  Whilst it 
is not easy to change deep-seated cultural mind-sets, ‘organisational 
cultures’ can be harnessed by transformational leaders (Sarros and Elliot 
2001; James 2001), both in government and business. Now, more than ever 
before, there is an urgency to secure a prosperous future for all Papua New 
Guineans, whilst resources and international goodwill last.  Failure to lay the 
foundations within the next five-year-term of parliament from 2002 will 
dissipate any hopes of achieving modest prosperity.  The following are 
critical to attaining a desirable future for all: 
 
 mature public sector management 
 
 a predictable governmental environment 
 
 security of life and property 
 
 the ending of official corruption, and 
 
 private sector expansion to generate jobs 
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Attainment of these prerequisites is contingent on changes in the mind-set 
of political and business leaders, and the extent to which a positive 
organisational culture can be nurtured. 
 
 
3.  Understanding the environment 
 
Managers in developing countries must be able to scan, analyse, understand 
and react to the environmental forces that surround the firm in order to 
function effectively(Kohn and Austin 1996; Etzioni 1968; Dror 1983).  
Developing countries’ contexts are complicated, continually in a state of flux 
and highly diverse.  Managers in PNG contend with: 
 
 high degrees of uncertainty in the political/governmental environment 
and therefore a volatile business climate 
 
 structural constraints inherent in a dualistic economy, e.g. limited road 
networks and land immobility 
 
 cultural constraints to rationality in decision-making, problem-solving and 
perception of the long-term 
 
 poor work ethic 
 
 weak bureaucracy 
 
 a public policy-making process geared towards improvisation and survival 
 
 terminal balance of payments disequilibrium, and 
 
 violent crime 
 
The business manager in PNG has to constantly scan the environment to 
pick out destabilising effects on the business.  (S)he does not have the 
luxury of taking her/his cue from documented public policies (e.g. budget 
documents) as these are subject to frequent change. Within a five-year term 
of a parliament, government can change hands twice, not to mention 
frequent changes in government departmental heads (Standish 1999). 
 
The business environment in PNG can be gauged by using a ‘conceptual 
map’ (Figure 1), which identifies the critical contextual variables and the 
analytical pathways and managerial implications of environmental forces 
(Kohn et al. 1996). 
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Figure 1.  Environmental analysis framework 
Source: Austin (1990). 
 
 
This conceptual map categorises external forces – economic, political, 
cultural and demographic – that affect the business environment at four 
levels – international, national, industry and company.  Only selective 
portions of the map are focused on, to underscore the point that business 
and political leaders can generate cultural mind-sets and minimise 
dysfunctions such as corruption.  These selected portions include the effects 
of cultural and political factors at the national, industry and company levels. 
 
Cultural and political factors have implications for the national environment, 
within which a company operates.  Government strategies and policies affect 
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business industry structure and dynamics, and ultimately condition 
companies in terms of their strategy and operations.  For instance, inertia in 
the National Executive Council, in addressing the deteriorating condition of 
road networks, directly affects the size and efficiency of land transport 
companies, affects retailers’ ability to target salaried consumer segments 
who are inaccessible by road, and affects companies’ ability to take 
advantage of export opportunities. 
 
Cultural and political factors are among many ‘environmental drivers of 
change’ that company managers try to gauge, using environmental analysis 
tools such as PEST analysis (political, economic, social and technological 
influences), and scenario planning (Johnson and Scholes 1999).  Moreover, 
in Michael Porter’s (1990) classic text, The competitive advantage of nations, 
he suggests that the national home base of an organisation plays a pivotal 
role in shaping the extent to which it is likely to achieve advantage on a 
global scale.  Companies can take advantage of home base factors to 
enhance positioning, or be impeded by these idiosyncrasies. 
 
3.1. Factors 
 
An overview of factors that impinge on business and politics in PNG, is given 
in Appendix 1.  PNG’s economy is characterised by abundant natural 
resources that remain underdeveloped. After 25 years of independence 
skilled human capital remains scarce, and, despite deregulation of the labour 
market in 1992, skilled labour continues to attract premium wage rates, in 
both the public and private sectors (Levantis 2000, Curtin 2000, Kavanamur 
and Kinkin 2000). 
 
Over 80 per cent of the workforce remain in the agriculture sector. At the 
same time, the value of the productivity of urban private sector labour is 3.6 
times the value of the productivity of rural labour (Levantis 2000:80).  
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries make up only 26 per cent of GDP.  Gross 
national product per capita has declined from a high of US$810 in the 1990s 
to a low of US$744 in 2000. Savings rates are low, reflecting the country’s 
limited financial market.  Physical infrastructure, information networks, and 
technological sophistication are weak. 
 
The political environment is characterised by high instability, reflecting weak 
democratic political institutions and the failure of attendant values and 
traditions to take root.  As for cultural factors, the social structures are 
egalitarian in nature, but allow bigmen to emerge, who are able to 
redistribute wealth.  Gender roles, on the other hand, are distinctly along 
patriarchal lines. 
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Demographic factors are also interesting.  The population growth rate has 
shot up to 3.1 per cent from a previous constant rate of 2.3 per cent 
(Appendix 1).  The age structure remains skewed towards a young 
dependent population, with little improvement to the overall life expectancy 
rate of 57 years.  Only 15 per cent of the population live in urban centers, 
but the current urbanisation growth rate per annum is 4 per cent, reflecting 
higher rural-urban migration.  PNG is one of the few countries in the world 
with low emigration to other countries.  Thus, with little growth in job 
creation, the youth easily turn to crime, drugs and prostitution (Levantis 
2000). 
 
 
Cultural factors 
 
While culture is a complex and hard-to-define phenomenon, there are 
aspects that lend themselves to analysis. The type of culture we are 
referring to is different from human nature on the one side, and an 
individual’s personality on the other, although exactly where the borders lie 
is debatable.  Culture is defined by Hofstede (1997:5) as: 
 
the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one 
group or category of people from another…[and] is learned, not inherited.  It 
derives from one’s social environment, not from one’s genes. 
 
Culture provides a set of orientations for members of a society.  These 
orientations, taken together, can provide solutions to problems, but may 
inhibit solutions under changing contexts, for instance, when abrupt social 
mobilisation of people leads to mass displacement. 
 
According to Buttery and Buttery (forthcoming) “[e]ducation and social 
systems, material culture, our attitudes also impact on perceptions of time, 
achievement, work, risk, decision-making, quality and change”. 
 
A comparison of the dimensions of organisations in developed and 
developing countries is shown in Appendix 2 3 . Characterisations of the 
developing country category reflect the modernisation theories of the 1960s, 
but, except for the trait of low masculinity values (which is higher in PNG), 
do broadly apply to PNG (e.g. low abstract thinking, past-present oriented 
time perspective, passive/reactive task orientation): 
                                                          
3   Care, must be taken in applying to PNG Hofstede’s (1997) Value Survey Model (VSM), based on a questionnaire 
of IBM employees, as aggregated data may not be entirely representative of all cultures within the countries studied.  
For example, Leith (2000) quotes Singh (1990) to argue that Hofstede’s research lacks conceptual validity. Hess 
(2001) also points out that a major difficulty with Hofstede’s approach is its sweeping generalisations, based on the 
dominant culture within a nation.  There is an obvious need to conduct an in-depth study in PNG on cultural values 
in business and government. 
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1. Low individualism (high collectivism): Public sector jobs are dished out 
without regard to organisation objectives or performance; as the 
individual performs tasks primarily to generate relationships with 
superiors, friends, and family and clan networks.  In PNG this process is 
referred to as wantokism, because wantoks are related through kinship, 
language, friendship or geographical location. 
 
2. High uncertainty avoidance: Individuals are unwilling to show personal 
initiatives on the job, as these are not encouraged or rewarded; so 
individuals are dependent on the authority structures and develop an 
external orientation (de Renzio and Kavanamur 1999). 
 
3. Low abstract thinking (high on associative thinking): explanations of 
events or policy decisions are derived from unrelated events, rather than 
cause-effect relationships.  Reversals of Cabinet decisions indicate a lack 
of rational decision-making processes and limited problem-solving 
capabilities. 
 
4. Past-present oriented time perspective (short-term): little future-oriented 
perspective (i.e. long-term thinking) due to the unpredictable and difficult 
environment. 
 
5. Passive/reactive task orientation: this is inimical to being proactive and to 
long-term planning for development, investment or savings. 
 
Business managers need to understand these variables and tailor human 
resource management policies, managerial practices, and interpersonal 
communications to generate new organisational cultures necessary for the 
attainment of a prosperous future.  Managers need to understand the 
society’s attitude towards human nature and towards work, time and space. 
 
Political factors 
 
The statement that ‘politics is a human activity that knows no boundary’ 
certainly holds true for PNG.  Papua New Guineans are fascinated with the 
exercise of power by political leaders, but are beginning to bemoan the 
encroachment of politics into the decision-making processes of government 
and its business arms (Baloiloi 2001; Nonggorr 2001d).  Baloiloi (2001) 
argues that the illegitimate exercise of power by political and bureaucratic 
leaders has left the decision-making processes devoid of a strong 
professional and rational culture.  Therefore, it can be argued that the 
fascination with political power has its roots in PNG’s national cultural mind-
set. 
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A key feature of the PNG business environment is political instability. 
Uncertainty increases direct costs, interferes with planning activities, and 
often leads to bureaucratic bottlenecks.  Drastic political changes result in 
economic upheavals that disrupt a company’s ability to operate normally.  It 
is not so much the polarisation of views (ideological or religious) that usher 
in increased security risks for personnel, especially expatriates (business and 
volunteers), but the sheer frustration of the populace with the inability of 
government to bring about improvements in community livelihoods. Crime 
rates continue to increase and there is growing resentment, not only among 
expatriate workers and overseas-owned business houses, but also among 
well-to-do citizens. 
 
Salient political factors that shape politics, and therefore business, can be 
linked to PNG’s current system of parliamentary elections.  Under the first-
past-the-post (or simple plurality) voting system, candidates only need to 
get the most votes to be elected.  The more candidates who stand, the 
smaller the winning margin, which also means that politicians’ chances of re-
election are slim, because they can easily be defeated in subsequent 
elections.  This factor in turn affects the MPs political behaviour while in 
office, and contributes to their pursuit of short term individual advantage.  It 
leads to frequent changes in party membership, government coalitions, 
government policy and resource allocation4. 
 
First, the degree of competitiveness in each of the 109 electorates, 
measured by the ‘margin of victory’ that separates the winner from the 
runner-up, increased in the period 1977-1997.  This a major factor behind 
the political insecurity of elected politicians.  Most provinces of the country 
have medium-risk and high-risk seats. From 1977 to 1997 the number of 
seats with winning margins of 2 per cent or less almost doubled, from 23 to 
44 out of a total of 109 seats (Okole 2001).  In 1997, 80 out of 109 MPs 
(73.4 per cent) won their seats by less than 6 per cent, again nearly double 
the number from 1977.  The only time two candidates won seats by a 60 per 
cent margin was in 1977, and none gained over 50 per cent in 1997.  Table 
1 shows these trends. 
 
 
Table 1.  Margin of victory, all seats 1977-1997. 
Range (%)           1977          1982         1987          1992            1997 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
0-2                      23              28             36              41                44 
3-4                      11              15             12              16                22 
                                                          
4 Dr Bill Standish, provided helpful clarification of the PNG election system.  
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5-6                        8              10             11                7                14 
7-8                      10              10             12              10                  7 
9-10                      8                6              7                 7                 5 
11-15                  14              10              16              14                 8 
16-20                    9                6               4                6                 2 
21-25                    5                4               1                4                 2 
26-30                  10                5               3                2                 1 
31-40                    6                7               1                1                 3 
41-50                    1                6               0                0                 1 
51-60                    2                2               3                1                 0 
60                       2                0               0                0                 0 
Total Seats        109             109           109             109             109 
Source: Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission (1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 
1997; Okole 2001). 
 
The high rate of incumbency turnover is further evidence of the 
unpredictability of the PNG political environment.  Table 2 shows the 
percentage of incumbents re-elected.  The most treacherous region for an 
incumbent is the Highlands, where over 60 per cent lose their seats each 
election. On the other hand, the New Guinea Islands region has the highest 
re-election rate of nearly 60 per cent.  A high degree of political education, 
conservatism, and disillusion with the country’s overall progress, reflected in 
low voter turnout and minimal fanfare at elections, are responsible for the 
region’s relative political stability. 
 
 
Table 2.  Incumbents re-elected, 1982-1997. 
Year       Highlands    NG Coastal    Papua    NG Islands     National 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
1982      30.8            51.7             35.5       58.8              42 
 
1987      35.9            41.4             45.8       58.8              43 
 
1992      30.8            34.5             29.2       47.1              34 
 
1997      38.5            44.8             45.8       58.8              45 
Source: Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission (1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 
1997; cited in and calculated by Okole 2001). 
 
The generally high incumbent electoral vulnerability rate forces first-time 
members to have a short term time perspective, seeking to accumulate as 
much wealth as possible before the next election (either for campaigning or 
as retirement funds).  It is not surprising that most politicians, who have 
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faced leadership tribunal charges of corruption, have been from medium-risk 
and high-risk seats.  
 
The large number of Independent candidates in the past five elections also 
contributed to PNG’s unstable political and business environment. In the 
1997 election 61 per cent of votes and 33 per cent of seats were gained by 
Independents. They are known for changing their party membership (yo-yo 
politics) and have been largely responsible for shifting coalitions in the term 
of a parliament.  However, the new Organic Law on the Integrity of Political 
Parties and Candidates (2000) may eliminate the dominance of 
Independents in parliament, and allow for a limited number of parties This 
would provide much needed stability 5 . Table 3 compares trends in the 
proportion of votes and the number of seats won by Independents from 
1977 to 1997.  
 
Table 3:  Percentage of Votes and seats won by Independents 
Year                          % Votes                          % Seats 
________________________________________________________ 
1977                             30                                   11.93 
1982                             21                                     3.67 
1987                             40.9                                20.18 
1992                             63.1                                 35.78 
1997                             61.4                                 33.03 
Source: Hegarty (1983:11), King (1989:4), Reilly (1999:238, 243), Saffu 
(1996:30); cited in Okole 2001). 
 
Second, the high turnover rate of managers in the public sector (i.e. both 
state-enterprises and the public service) does not bode well for continuity in 
public policy formulation and execution. Since mid-1995 the Department of 
Treasury and Planning has had six different secretaries.  Constant 
restructuring contributes little towards improving the current dismal quality 
of public sector management and governance (World Bank 1999).  The 
Planning Office has been frequently reorganised, without plausible 
organisational design or change management rationales.  Institutional 
capacity to formulate and implement policy reforms has been on the decline 
since 1987, when the Wingti-regime came into power.  Filer (2000) has 
documented recent forest policy-making processes, where conceptions of 
‘public interest’ have become clouded by ‘politics of personality’. 
 
Third, executive government decision-making through the Cabinet lacks 
rational components, with implications for the business environment.  
Decisions are often made without debate or analysis by (and sometimes 
                                                          
5  However, that there are limits to political engineering, particularly if the attendant cultures and tradition associated 
with democratic institutions do not take root (see May 2000; Standish 2001). 
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without the knowledge of) important parties to the transactions, e.g. Central 
Bank and Department of Treasury and Planning.  This leads to numerous 
reversals of Cabinet decisions, causing considerable confusion and inertia.  
Clearly, the Cabinet secretariat needs to be staffed by experienced 
professionals. 
 
Fourth, the government’s experience with state-enterprise management 
took a nose-dive after the 1992 elections.  Almost all state-enterprises are 
now technically insolvent, including the Electricity Commission, Post & 
Telecommunications Corporation, Air Niugini, PNG Harbours Board, PNG 
Banking Corporation, Motor Vehicle Insurance Limited, Investment 
Corporation, and Agriculture Bank.  Accounting and financial management, 
and the control environment, appear to have collapsed.  The collapse in 
state enterprise management quality is largely attributable to political 
intervention and wantokism, which followed a decision in the early 1990s to 
corporatise such entities.  The time lag between corporatisation and 
privatisation allowed incompetent board members, with little or no 
experience in corporate governance, to preside over important service 
providers. 
 
However, there is some hope that, before the 2002 elections, the Morauta 
Government can stem the slide in public sector management and set the 
platform for privatisation.  A number of ‘organisation structure reforms’ and 
‘process reorientations’ (e.g. new laws on political parties and candidates, 
planned electoral laws, the law guaranteeing the Central Bank’s 
independence from the executive, and laws regulating the insurance and 
superannuation sectors) have already been undertaken or set in train, but 
more needs to be done. 
 
4. Strategies 
 
A number of the interrelated strategies noted here have the potential to 
trigger a change at the organisational level. However, hopes for a better 
future hinge on interventions at the government and business organisational 
levels, and a change in the cultural mind-set partly responsible for PNG’s 
development failures. 
 
Governmental level 
 
In the interest of the country, political and bureaucratic leaders should 
commit themselves to a number of reforms, regardless of whether they are 
in government or not. 
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1. Politicians at all levels need to commit themselves to electoral reforms 
in order to address the low ‘margin of victory’ and reduce the high 
‘electoral vulnerability’ in the Highlands, New Guinea Coastal and 
South Coastal (Papuan) regions, and the National Capital District.  
These factors have had negative flow-on effects reducing the ‘long 
term time perspective’ of politicians, and their capacity for institutional 
memory. 
 
2. The high turnover rate of CEOs in the public sector has to be 
addressed to ensure continuity in public policy formulation and 
execution.  This will improve executives’ time orientation. 
 
3. Decision-making avenues within Cabinet, parliament, departments, 
and intergovernmental committees need to be reinforced by 
experienced professionals, research  and technology, so as to increase 
the chances of rational policy outcomes  and reduce the dominance of 
intuition.  This process is bound to improve the government’s level of 
abstract and analytical thinking and problem-solving capabilities. 
 
4. Governments need to institute comprehensive public sector reforms to 
address the current situation, of 64,000 employees costing over K600 
million, plus consultancy fees of over K100 million per year, and 
office/accommodation rentals of between K25-50 million per year 
(Kavanamur and Kinkin 1998, 2000).  This should be done after 
stakeholders are sensitised, and a professional Public Service census 
and thorough job and functional audit are undertaken to match tasks 
and organisational objectives. 
 
5. It is necessary to tighten up and standardise entry qualifications for 
the public service and recruit on a ‘scrap and build’ strategy.  The 
public service needs to institute entry tests and productivity appraisals 
to reduce the practice of recruiting personnel without concern for 
performance objectives. 
 
6. There is a need to enhance institutions offering management training 
in-country to help forge a strong management culture, cognisant of 
local and global conditions. 
 
7. A privatisation strategy to free up government from business should 
be pursued, so that resources can be diverted to maintaining and 
building new infrastructure. The aim should be to facilitate an ‘export 
oriented economy’ and increase government contribution to social 
services.  The transfer of public enterprises to the private sector would 
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reduce opportunities for ‘rent seeking’ by corrupt management 
practices (Hughes 2000). 
 
8. The National Parliament should expedite the establishment of an 
independent regulator to ensure services provided by privatised state 
enterprises and the private sector are efficient, and better and more 
reasonably priced.  Legislation for the establishment of an 
Independent Competition and Consumer Commission is in the pipeline 
(Post Courier [Online] 12 September 2001). 
 
9. Government needs to review the public tendering practice of ‘selective 
tendering and ‘special favours’ or ‘sweet-heart deals’ with business.  
Numerous reports by the Ombudsman Commission and the Auditor 
General suggest that this practice is rampant (Kavanamur 1998b; 
Mawuli et al. 1997). 
 
10. Government must try to stabilise the business environment, by 
addressing the following major impediments (Manning 1999): 
 
 crime and theft 
 
 corruption 
 
 poor infrastructure 
 
 policy instability 
 
 inflation 
 
 tax levels and regulations 
 
 uncertainty on cost regulation 
 
Security is such a huge concern that business spends big amounts just 
to secure property and life.  The proliferation of guns, serious violence 
and drug related crime adds to the already complex problem.  Levantis 
(2000:17) estimates that in 1995,  the average weekly cash earnings 
of criminals in Port Moresby was K37.70. The estimated number of 
raskols was 32,243, most were part-time or short term, but it is still 
an extraordinarily high figure.  The average income of criminals is far 
above the official minimum wage of K22.96 per week, applied in urban 
centres after 1992.  Within society at large, existing retributive state 
responses are failing to deter and control crime and violence, despite 
consuming large amounts of scarce resources (Dinnen 1998:5).  At 
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worst, these responses are counterproductive and only reinforce the 
cycle of violence between criminals and police. 
 
 
11. A new approach to labour relations will have to be adopted to address 
the high unemployment rate. Aggregate unemployment for the 
country stands at 30 percent, but Port Moresby alone has 60 per cent 
unemployment rate (McGavin 1997; Post Courier [Online] 12 
September 2001).  Strategies will have to be developed to provide 
‘part-time’ and ‘shift work’ for those not represented by organised 
unions.  Project construction must factor in the need for ‘seasonal 
jobs’.   
 
12. In Port Moresby, land must be made available and basic infrastructure 
built as a pilot project for the incubation and encouragement of micro-
and small-enterprises. This would be along the lines of the Italian 
industrial district model, or industrial clusters in Brazil, Mexico, Ghana, 
Pakistan and India (see Schmitz 1990, 1992; Sengenberger and Pyke 
1992; Baza and Schmitz 1997; Brown 1996). 
 
13. Increase funding for the Small Business Development Corporation 
(SBDC)’s business courses and the PNG Grassroots University’s 
personal viability courses to change the cultural mind-set of ‘high 
uncertainty avoidance’ that inhibits individuals from taking 
‘entrepreneurial initiatives’ and erase their belief that the external 
environment controls them. 
 
14. Free handouts (such as MPs’ electorate and ‘slush’ funds of K1.5 
million each) should be reduced, in preference for building 
infrastructure and community-wide services.  Incentives should be 
built into social funds, similar to the AusAID Incentive Fund, to reduce 
the current pervasive ‘hand-out mentality’. 
 
Business level 
 
A number of strategies are also suggested for reform-minded business 
leaders in order to help create a predictable business environment. 
 
1. The need to steer business away from corruption when interfacing with 
government requires corporate leaders to train their middle managers 
in ‘political skills’ (i.e. in recognising and forming coalitions, using 
power and influence, and in processes of negotiation and compromise) 
to effectively handle the government environment (see Limerick et al. 
1993; Limerick et al. 1998). 
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2. Business leaders through their varying professional bodies such as the 
PNG Institute of Directors, PNG Institute of Banking and Business and 
the Australian Institute of Management (AIM), Transparency 
International and Australia’s Securities and Investment Commission 
(ASIC, which regulates the stock market and corporate behaviour) 
could co-operate in providing workshops and training to enhance the 
quality of corporate governance, particularly financial governance. 
 
3. Privatisation alone is not enough.  This process should operate in 
tandem with the training of good managers to turn the country around.  
Business leaders can play a key role in the area of ‘mentoring’ of their 
middle level managers as well as ‘on-the-job training’ through 
management ‘cadet-ship programs’.  In addition, short-term job 
attachments in Australia should also be encouraged as a sure way of 
moulding cultural mind-sets. 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has touched on sensitive issues, which understandably 
Australians have either steered away from, or hesitantly alluded to in 
discussions about the development impasse in PNG.  But we must take the 
bull by the horns, as it were, in our endeavour to deal with the problem. 
Resources, including money and access to appropriate technology, are not 
the missing link; it is the requisite cultural mind-set for organisational 
performance, i.e., in terms of goal achievement. 
 
This is not to say that there is a complete absence of a requisite managerial 
culture. Far from it.  Twenty-five years of Independence has seen the 
cultivation of a nascent managerial and leadership culture, but unfortunately 
this is still insufficient to offset the disregard for the common good, 
stemming from a predominant fascination with political power and 
wantokism or patronage.  This negative social capital then leads to a low 
state of productivity and professionalism. 
 
The negative implications have far reaching effects, but are not 
insurmountable.  What is required is a clear-headed audit of the national 
cultural mind-set, vis-à-vis management and governance issues.  How much 
of it is due to socialisation of customs through tradition, how much to 
broader environmental factors, and how much stems from institutional 
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factors? One then has to decide what aspects are controllable through 
organisational intervention, and what aspects can only be altered over time. 
 
Here, we are assuming that the bulk of Papua New Guineans desire a 
doubling of living standards by year 2020, following the development path 
currently officially espoused.  However, there is no doubt that economic 
development is desired by grassroots people, as evidenced in numerous 
studies on perceptions of development (Wilson 1975; Colebatch 1977; 
Turner 1980, 1986; articles in Hegarty 1983; Sillitoe 1983; Kavanamur 
1994). 
 
In this paper, we have speculated that recent deregulation and privatisation 
exercises, political reforms to the political party system and electoral 
system, and economic reforms all have the potential to contribute to stable 
governments and a stable business environment.  In addition, the country’s 
natural and energy resources could enable a doubling of living standards in 
the next 20 years. 
 
However, current political and business problems need to be addressed.  
These include: 
 
 The current first-past-the-post voting system, which is a major factor 
behind the political insecurity of elected politicians and counterproductive 
to progress, as it forces politicians to unashamedly amass wealth through 
corrupt means. 
 
 Political prerogatives, such as the power to hire and fire departmental 
secretaries and state enterprise CEOs, undermine continuity in policy 
formulation and execution. 
 
 Lack of sensitivity by the IMF/World Bank or ADB in appearing to urge 
measures, such as land mobilisation, which only serves to dissipate 
support for broader economic reforms (Kavanamur 1998a; Filer and Kalit 
1999).  Land mobilisation should be last on the list, and then done 
strategically by more autonomous provincial governments who have to 
raise part of their own revenue.  This will leave decisions on land reform 
at the local level rather than the top. 
 
 Fatigue from a plethora of simultaneous reform programs generates 
resentment, especially if urban unemployment is increased. 
 
 The flow-on effect of political instability into the business environment via 
the factoring in of kickbacks to tendering prices for multi-million Kina 
projects. 
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 Politically-motivated crime at the local level impacts negatively on 
foreign-owned businesses, with some politicians aligned to criminal gangs 
(Standish 2001). 
 
The causes of these well-known problems are many, but the key ones 
identified and highlighted in this paper are attributable to the prevailing 
national cultural mind-set: They include: 
 
 Minimal understanding of and exposure to economics and business limits 
politicians’ understanding of the need for economic reforms. 
 
 Low levels of abstract thinking, and high associative thinking, causes a 
lack of appreciation of the implications of political actions and decisions 
amongst politicians, especially at Cabinet level. 
 
 Past-present time perspectives (or short term time frames), caused by 
institutional factors such as the FPTP voting system, as well as the effects 
of historical ‘subsistence affluence’ in village life, prevent planning for the 
future. 
 
 Volatile and unpredictable business environment forces business to 
succumb to temptation, and to collude in corruption. 
 
 Widespread hysteria, fuelled by religious beliefs and misinformation by 
aspiring candidates and NGOs (playing the ‘nationalist card’ and 
supporting nationalisation policies popularised in Africa and Latin America 
in the 1960s) instils fear about World Bank/IMF economic reform 
programs. 
 
Key strategies aimed at resolving many of these problems are suggested 
here.  Many of these have to be undertaken by PNG itself, while other areas 
require funding and support by the Australian government, PNG’s major 
development partner, as well as support from Australian business leaders 
with operations in PNG.  The following strategies are suggested for different 
actors and sectors. 
 
Reform-minded Papua New Guinean leaders 
 
 Political party development and electoral system reforms to minimise 
political instability will improve continuity in policy formulation and 
execution 
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 Strategic timing and sequencing of economic reform policies will allay 
widespread apprehension about a possible Bretton Woods (IMF-World 
Bank) ‘take-over’ of the country.  It is politically prudent to implement 
economic reform only in the year after (rather than just before) an 
election, so as to minimise fear of ‘electoral backlash’ among incumbent 
politicians 
 
 Strengthening research capacity and think-tanks (e.g., the National 
Research Institute and Institute of National Affairs) would enhance 
rational decision-making. 
 
 The role of the Public Service Commission should be restored, avenues 
for corrupt behaviour by political and bureaucratic leaders minimised, and 
incentives eliminated.6 
 
Business leaders 
 
 To help change cultural mind-sets, ethical values need to be infused into 
the PNG business environment at the organisational level. 
 
 ‘Mentoring’ and ‘management cadet-ship’ programs within companies as 
well as attachment opportunities for PNG executives in Australian 
company headquarters would help infuse a new set of corporate values to 
‘next generation managers’. Some companies such as BHP and Chevron 
are already undertaking such mentoring. 
 
Australian government assistance 
 
 An exchange program for PNG and Australian technocrats would enhance 
understanding and improve the rational component in PNG’s decision-
making processes.  
 
 Management training opportunities in Australia should be increased and 
assistance provided to raise the quality of management degrees offered 
at the University of Papua New Guinea and the University of Technology. 
(UPNG has now embarked on a new School of Business Administration 
                                                          
6 For example, through the review of Public Tendering processes, Office Allocation 
Committee, Consultancy Steering Committee, Public Works Committee Act, Public Services 
(Management) Act, Public Finances (Management) Act, Public Service General Orders, 
Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership, Leadership Code, Loans 
(Overseas Borrowings) Act, Appropriation Act, Salaries and Conditions Monitoring 
Committee (SCMC) Act. 
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after 25 years of educating students on export pessimism, African 
socialism and Latin American dependency theory). 
 
 Support for the establishment of basic infrastructure for industrial clusters 
(districts) in Port Moresby and later in other centres to ‘stimulate 
employment’ and ‘incubate’ micro-and small-enterprises 
 
The overall aim, then, is to improve the mindset of people in government 
and business in PNG.  Unless we can do that, cultural factors will continue to 
drag PNG down.  If we can do it, PNG will be able to fulfil its potential. 
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Appendix 1.  Summary of environmental factors in PNG. 
                                        Development level (GNP per capita) 
    Low (PNG)                                High 
Economic factors 
Natural resources 
  importance to economy         high                                         lower 
  availability                            underdeveloped                        developed 
Labour 
  skilled human capital             scarce                                      abundant 
  % workforce in agriculture     80%                                       15% 
Capital 
  GNP per capita (US$)            $744                                       $15,000 
  savings rates                         low                                          somewhat high 
  income inequality                   medium                                   low 
  financial institutions               weak                                        strong 
  inflation                                 moderate                                 low 
  capital flight                           outflow                                    inflow 
Foreign exchange 
  exchange-rate volatility          moderate                                   low 
  trade deficits                         medium                                     low 
  range of exports                    narrow                                       broad 
  debt service burden               high                                           low 
  concessional foreign aid         recipient                                     donor 
Infrastructure 
  physical infrastructure           weak                                          strong 
  information availability          low (unreliable)                           high (reliable) 
Technology 
  technology flows                   recipient                                     supplier 
  sophistication                       low                                             high 
  industry structure                 dualistic                                      unitary 
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Political factors 
  instability                             high                                            low 
  political institutions               weak                                           strong 
  international links                 dependent                                   more autonomy 
Cultural factors 
  social structures                    egalitarian                                    less rigid 
  gender roles                         very distinct                                  less distinct 
  language                              high diversity                                low diversity 
  religion                                high                                              low 
Demographic factors 
  annual pop. growth rate          3.1%                                          0.5% 
  age structure                         young                                         older 
  life expectancy                       57 yrs                                         77 yrs 
  urbanisation (% of total pop.)  15%                                           80% 
  urbanisation growth/year         4%                                             0.8% 
  migration                                low                                            high 
Source: Kohn and Austin 1996; The National [Online] 24 September 2001; 
Govt.of PNG 1999; Post Courier [Online] 3 September 2001. 
 
 
Appendix 2.  Dimensions on which organisations in developed 
                      and developing countries differ. 
Dimensions                       Developed countries        Developing countries 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
A.  Economic and political environment 
Predictability of events       Relatively high                 Relatively low 
 
Difficulty of obtaining         Relatively easy                 Relatively difficult 
resources from environment 
 
B. Socio-cultural environment 
Uncertainty avoidance        Relatively low                   Relatively high 
 
Individualism-collectivism   Relatively high                  Relatively low 
                                        individualism                    individualism 
 
Power distance                  Relatively low                    Relatively high 
 
Masculinity-femininity        Relatively high                   Relatively low 
                                       masculinity                         masculinity 
 
Abstractive-associative      Relatively high                    Relatively low 
thinking                           abstractive/low                    abstractive/high 
                                        associative thinking            associative thinking 
 
C. Internal work culture (management values and climate of beliefs) 
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Causality and control of      Internal                             External 
outcomes 
 
Creative potential               Unlimited                           Limited 
Time perspective                Future-oriented                  Past and present 
Time units for action           Long term                          Short term 
Task orientation                 Proactive                            Passive/reactive 
Success orientation            Pragmatism                        Moralism 
People orientation              Collegial/participative          Authoritarian/ 
                                                                                 paternalistic 
Environment orientation     Context independent           Context dependent 
Source: Kanungo and Jaeger (1990); Hofstede (1997); Mendonca and 
Kanungo (1997). 
 
